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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Third World Debt and Environmental Crises
The macroeconomic relationship between the rich, industrialized
nations of the world and the middle-income developing countries
began to reverse in 1982. Economic resources began to flow from the
developing countries to the developed ones,' mainly because develop-
ing countries paid more in interest on their foreign loans than they
received in net new borrowing and direct investment.2 Belt-tighten-
ing, necessary to service their outstanding foreign debt, stifled the eco-
nomic growth of these developing countries and frustrated their
return as viable markets for exports from the United States and other
industrialized nations.' The continual drain of resources and the
1. Orr, Third-world Debt: New Fixes Needed, ABA BANKING J., Apr. 1987, at 79. The
decade from 1982 to 1992 will witness the transfer from the developing countries to the
developed countries of 314 billion dollars. Id.
2. Id.
3. Foreign Debt: Listen to Bill Bradley, BUSINESS WEEK, July 28, 1986, at 92.
Developing countries, for the most part, are commodity exporters. Price declines of oil and
other commodities have led to more production and less earnings for commodities sold by
exporters in world markets. To make matters worse, prices of imported manufactured goods
have not dropped to compensate for export price declines. See Orr, supra note 1, at 80. The
United States and Europe have directly contributed to the problem:
European nations have thwarted imports from developing countries to bring
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resultant shrinking of national economies has left many of these
nations on the verge of bankruptcy and has threatened their political
stability.
Under pressure to pay their external debt, many countries
employ quick-fix solutions that exhaust their natural resources and
therefore undercut their economic potential as a nation.5 One such
solution serves only to create an ecological crisis with global ramifica-
tions: the rapid destruction of rain forests together with their plant
and animal species.6 The ominous consequences were described in a
recent article:
In 20 years the forests of the tropics will be largely stripped
bare unless Third World countries slow their ravenous logging and
mining. Countless species of plants and animals will die in "the
greatest extinction since the end of the age of the dinosaurs"....
But biology lectures carry little clout with poor countries desperate
for cash to pay huge foreign debts.7
This trend toward ecological disaster is most evident in the develop-
ing countries of the Central and South American tropics. Ironically,
the trend is a product of a well-intentioned effort to repay the debt
owed to developed nations.
down their own stubbornly high unemployment. The U.S. also inhibits the flow
of imports to "protect" domestic jobs. But this country's main uses of the
inflowing resources are to help finance its budget deficit. In effect, the U.S. is
asking poorer nations to tighten their belts--consume less and export more of the
wealth they produce-so we can loosen our belts, continuing to consume more
and save less of the wealth we produce.
Id. See also 7 Latin Leaders Agree to Seek Joint Debt Reduction Strategy, Miami Herald, Oct.
29, 1988, at 7A, col. 4 (Brazilian Foreign Minister Mailson Ferreira da Nobrega remarked:
"There is a broad consensus that there is no possibility of development in our countries with-
out a reduction of the debt.").
4. Moreover, as one United States Senator has recognized, "[T]he existence of these huge
debts also has ramifications for our balance of trade, the soundness of our financial institutions,
and the general political stability of these developing countries." Charitable Deduction for
Donors of Debt of Developing Nations: Introduction of S. 1781 Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S14,063-64 (1987) [hereinafter S. 1781]
(statement of Sen. John Chafee, R-R.I.); see, e.g., Brazil Lunges Nearer to Out-of-Control
Inflation, Miami Herald, Oct. 22, 1988, at 7D, col. 1. Due to runaway inflation, blamed on the
debt crises, angry, underpaid workers have engaged in strikes that have paralyzed more than a
dozen government ministries and agencies. Id. at col. 6.
5. Shabecoff, Bolivia to Protect Lands in Swap for Lower Debt, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1987,
at C2, col. 3.
6. Id.
7. Copeland, Buying Debt, Saving Nature, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 31, 1987, at 46 (quoting
Harvard biologist E.O. Wilson).
8. See Shabecoff, supra note 5, at C2, col. 3.
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B. Debt-for-Nature Swaps.
It is very difficult for developing nations to expend financial
resources on the environment when there are many other competing
human needs that first must be satisfied. International environmental
groups, well aware of this dilemma, have developed an imaginative
way to help developing nations implement and maintain conservation
programs. Taking a cue from increasingly popular debt/equity
swaps,9 these environmental groups have offered, essentially, to pay
Third World government debts in exchange for conservation conces-
sions within the countries.
Through these so-called "debt-for-nature swaps," conservation
organizations acquire Third World debt from U.S. banks as a charita-
ble contribution.10 Subsequently, they negotiate with the debtor
country to redeem the debt for local currency and then use these
funds to finance environmental conservation in that country. Because
debt is redeemed in local currency" and the funds are dedicated for
use in local conservation programs, debt redemption commands a
substantial premium in excess of the prices at which debt is traded in
world markets.12
C. Tax Considerations: A Deterrent to Contributing
Debt to Charity
Tax law limits the charitable deduction to the market value of
9. A debt/equity swap involving national debt is a complex multi-party transaction.
Typically, it involves the transfer of a debt instrument back to a debtor country in exchange for
an equity position in a new or existing entity in the country. A multinational corporation,
desiring to make a new investment or increase investment in a foreign country, purchases that
country's debt from a bank at a deep discount. The corporation then presents the debt
instrument to the Finance Minister of the debtor country, who cancels it for the face amount
in local currency. The local currency is then used to make the desired investment. When the
investor is a United States bank, the debt is directly swapped with the debtor country. For a
detailed description of debt/equity swaps, see paper by W. Alexander & J. Ross, Consequences
of Debt/Equity Schemes (unpublished manuscript) in Letter from John B. Ross to Ellen April,
Tax Legislative Counsel, United States Treasury (Feb. 17, 1988) (available on Westlaw, Tax
Analyst database) [hereinafter Consequences of Debt/Equity Schemes].
10. The charitable organization can acquire the debt either by outright purchase from a
United States bank or by contribution from the bank' to the charitable organization. This
Comment deals only with the latter situation as anticipated by Revenue Ruling 87-124. See
infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
11. Payment in local currency does not impact adversely the debtor nation's balance of
payments as would payments of United States dollars in the ordinary course of the debt
instrument's maturity. The charitable organization, though rewarded by an increase in the
value of its donation is, however, also saddled with the prospect of decreased purchasing power
due to local inflation. See Lamp, A Tax Blueprint for LDC Debt Swaps, 1988 TAx NoTEs
1215, 1218.
12. See S. 1781, supra note 4, at S14,064.
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the property donated. 13 Thus, if a lender donates Third World debt
with a market value below its cost basis 4 to a charitable organization,
the lender will be unable to recover its entire cost basis in the debt
through the charitable deduction. 5 Alternatively, if the lender sells
the debt to the charitable organization at the discounted market price,
the lender will be entitled to a deduction for only the amount of the
loss realized on the sale.' 6 Either scenario places the lender in a worse
position than if it had simply sold the debt, taking a deduction for the
loss, and donated the proceeds of the sale to charity, taking an addi-
tional deduction for a charitable donation.'7
D. Treasury to the Rescue
In order to encourage United States banks to donate their lesser-
developed-country (LDC) debt for charitable purposes in foreign
countries, the United States Department of the Treasury intends to
construe liberally"8 the debt-for-charity section of Revenue Ruling 87-
124.'9 Revenue Ruling 87-124 permits banks to transfer directly their
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-I(c) (as amended in 1984) (The amount of the contribution is the
fair market value of the property at the time of the contribution.).
14. Basis generally equals the taxpayer's cost of the property. See I.R.C. § 1012 (1986).
15. The deduction would be limited to the fair market value of the property. See supra
note 13.
16. I.R.C. §§ 165, 1001 (1986).
17. This two-step transaction allows for a deduction of the taxpayer's total basis in the
property. See, e.g., Federal Income Taxation of Banks and Financial Institutions, BANKING
L.J. $ 9.14, at 9-27 (E. Krader 5th ed. 1978) [hereinafter Taxation of Banks].
18. See Letter from C. Eugene Steuerle, Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax
Analysis, to Sen. John H. Chafee, R-R.I., Senate Finance Committee member (Mar. 29, 1988),
reprinted in 1988 TAX NOTES 402.
19. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205. Revenue Rulings are opinions, issued by the IRS,
concerning matters of law arising in particular fact settings. They often advise taxpayers about
specific legal issues. Rulings are somewhat less authoritative than Treasury Regulations, but
they are significant in the day-to-day administration of tax laws and are persuasive to the
courts. See W. KLEIN, B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (7th ed. 1987).
Revenue Ruling 87-124 deals with three debt swap situations. The first two concern
typical debt/equity swaps, and the third concerns debt-for-charity swaps. This Comment
discusses only the third situation. The transaction is described as follows:
FACTS
X, a United States commercial bank, holds a United States dollar
denominated debt (the Obligation) of the central bank (the Central Bank) of
foreign country FC. The Obligation evidences a loan of $100 that X made to the
Central Bank. X's adjusted basis in the Obligation, as determined under section
1011 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, is $100. Under the laws of FC, the
Obligation cannot be held by an FC entity.
The local currency of FC is the LC. On July 1, 1987, the free market
exchange rate was $1 = 10 LCs.
FC has a program (the Program) whereby a holder of United States dollar
denominated debt of FC can negotiate with the Central Bank to deliver the FC
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LDC debt to the debtor country, for a charitable purpose in that
country, and allows the bank a deduction for its full cost basis in the
debt.2" This seemingly straightforward interpretation has been the
cause of considerable bewilderment in the tax and banking commu-
nity2' because it constitutes a complete reversal of the Internal Reve-
nue Service's (IRS) traditional interpretations 22 of tax codes dealing
with losses,23 bad debts, 24 and charitable contributions.25
debt to the Central Bank for LCs if the holder agrees to ... use the LCs in FC in
a manner approved in advance by the government of FC. The Program controls
the LCs by... channeling the LCs to their designated use in FC.... The amount
of LCs the Central Bank will give the holder in exchange for the debt varies
according to how the LCs are used.
In accordance with a prearranged plan pursuant to the Program, the
following transaction[] occurred on July 1, 1987:
Situation 3
[X delivered the Obligation to the Central Bank.] ... [T]he Central Bank
credited an account of Z, a United States corporation that is a charitable
organization described in section 170(c)(2) of the Code, with 900 LCs. Under
the terms of the Program, Z can use the 900 LCs only in FC for charitable
purposes meeting the requirements of section 170 ....
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Situation 3
X will be treated as if it received the 900 LCs from the Central Bank in
exchange for the Obligation and then contributed the 900 LCs to Z. X
recognizes a loss on the exchange of the Obligation ... ($100) over the fair
market value of the 900 LCs. In addition, assuming X and Z satisfy all
requirements of the Code relating to charitable contributions, X is entitled to a
charitable contribution deduction under section 170 of the Code equal to the fair
market value of the 900 LCs at the time of the contribution ....
Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205, 205-06.
20. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205, 206 (HOLDINGS section, Situation 3).
21. See Dionne, Revenue Ruling on Debt/Equity Swaps Leaves Unanswered Questions-To
the Delight of the Tax Bar, 1988 TAX NOTES 166 [hereinafter Dionne, Revenue Ruling]
("Despite this ruling, the tax treatment of the debt/equity swaps is still unclear."); Dionne,
Treasury Agrees to Construe Revenue Ruling on Debt-for-Nature Swaps Liberally, 1988 TAX
NOTES 307 [hereinafter Dionne, Treasury Agrees] ("[T]he ruling thus far has done little to
achieve its goal because of bank concerns over deduction consequences.") "[A]mbiguities in
Rev. Rul. 87-124 created a disincentive to claim a charitable contribution deduction ...." Id.
at 308.
John B. Ross, Banking Advisor to the Institute of International Finance, Inc.,
Washington, D.C., has suggested that Revenue Ruling 87-124 be clarified. Letter from John
B. Ross to Ellen April, Tax Legislative Counsel, United States Treasury (Feb. 17, 1988). Ross
wrote: "I understand perfect certainty-beyond death and taxes in general-is not envisioned,
but I think it is necessary to reduce significantly the level of uncertainty surrounding Revenue
Ruling 87-124." Id.; see also TAX NOTES INT'L, Mar. 2, 1988, at 28 (David Kline, President
of the Fund for Private Assistance in International Development, has submitted to Treasury a
proposed revenue ruling to clarify Revenue Ruling 87-124).
22. But see Lamp, supra note 11, at 1220 ("The U.S. Treasury has done much to make
debt for charity swaps possible without violating traditional tax rules.").
23. I.R.C. § 165 (1986).
24. I.R.C. § 166 (1986).
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This Comment analyzes the contradictions presented by Revenue
Ruling 87-124. In Section II, this Comment discusses the transaction
envisioned by the IRS in Revenue Ruling 87-124 and the two-step
analysis applied to it. Section III examines the motivation for banks
to undertake this transaction and argues that the transaction should
be considered for its ultimate result-allowing a deduction for a bad
debt. Section IV then examines ambiguities raised by allowing the
deduction for a charitable contribution to a foreign country. Finally,
in Section V, this Comment concludes that definitive legislation is
necessary in order to avoid abuse and to quiet confusion over the
intended tax treatment of debt-for-nature swaps.
II. THE RULING
A. Contemplated Fact Situation
Revenue Ruling 87-124 describes the federal income tax conse-
quences to a lender resulting from various transactions that are part
of a foreign country's program to reduce the amount of its outstand-
ing United States dollar-denominated debt.26 Under a prearranged
program, a United States commercial bank delivers a debt instrument
to the Central Bank of the debtor country. The Central Bank then
credits the account of a United States charitable organization that
meets the requirements of Section 170(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code (the Code). The amount of this credit is a predetermined per-
25. I.R.C. § 170 (1986).
26. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205.
27. Section 170 of the Code provides in part:
§ 170. Charitable, etc., contributions and gifts
(a) Allowance of Deduction.-
(1) General Rule.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any
charitable contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made
within the taxable year. A charitable contribution shall be allowable as a
deduction only if verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his
delegate.
(c) Charitable Contribution Defined.-For purposes of this section, the
term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of-
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation-
(A) created or organized in the United States or in any
possession thereof, or under the law of the United States, any State, the District
of Columbia, or any possession of the United States;
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
[Vol. 43:721
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centage of the original debt28 and is payable to the charitable organi-
zation in the local currency of the foreign country.2 9 In addition, the
local currency deriving from this credit is to be used solely in the
foreign country for purposes meeting the requirements of Section
170.30
In the factual scenario just described, the IRS treats the United
States bank as having received the local currency from the Central
Bank and then having contributed the local currency to the charitable
organization. 31 As a result of this treatment, United States banks may
recognize a loss on the exchange of the obligation for the local cur-
rency 32 and are entitled to a charitable contribution deduction under
Section 170 of the Code, equal to the fair market value of the local
scientific, literary, or educational purposes .... or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals;
(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual; and
(D) no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.
A contribution or gift by a corporation to a trust, chest, fund, or foundation shall
be deductible by reason of this paragraph only if it is to be used within the United
States or any of its possessions exclusively for purposes specified in subparagraph
(B).
28. The amount is predicated on how the funds are to be used within the foreign country.
See Alexander & Ross, supra note 9. This presents the issue of how the market value of the
donated debt is to be determined. Id. The market value of the amount of foreign currency
deposited by the central bank to the account of the charitable organization may bear no
relation to the actual market value of the debt. Id. For instance, a debt obligation of a foreign
country might sell on the open market for 60% of its United States dollar face value, but
because the debt is being redeemed in local currency, the foreign country might be willing to
deposit an amount equal to 90% of the face value. Id. Other valuation issues have been
raised, such as determining the adjustment in market value if the foreign currency is restricted
to use in the foreign country. Id.
29. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205, 205-06.
30. Prior revenue rulings have carved out exceptions to the apparent proscriptions against
use of the donated funds outside the United States or its possessions. Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1
C.B. 48; Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2 C.B. 101. Funds donated to an otherwise qualified domestic
organization can be excepted, even though the domestic organization grants funds to
charitable groups organized in a foreign country. If the purposes of the domestic organization
are furthered by granting funds to the foreign group, and no special funds are solicited on
behalf of the foreign group, then donations made to the domestic organization are deductible.
Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2 C.B. 101. Similarly, a domestic organization that forms a foreign
subsidiary to facilitate its charitable work in the foreign country and solicits funds for its
foreign activities is considered to be the true beneficiary of funds donated to it, rendering those
funds deductible. Id. "The test in each case is whether the organization has full control of the
donated funds, and discretion as to their use, so as to insure that they will be used to carry out
its functions and purposes." Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48, 51.
31. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205, 206 (LAW AND ANALYSIS, Situation 3).
32. The loss is equal to the excess of the bank's adjusted basis in the obligation over the
fair market value of the local currency. Id.; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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currency at the time of the donation.33 Thus, under this interpreta-
tion, United States banks may recognize a loss equal to their total
adjusted basis in the debt.34
B. Reversal of Tradition
Much of the confusion surrounding Revenue Ruling 87-124
stems from the Treasury's bifurcation of the debt-swap transaction.
Taken separately, each transaction routinely gives rise to distinct,
generally sanctioned tax consequences. Ordinarily, the exchange or
sale of United States dollar debt obligations for a lesser amount of
foreign local currency, although not devoid of interpretive problems,
would give rise to a deductible loss under Section 165 of the Code.35
One asset, the loan receivable, would be exchanged for another asset
of lesser value, the LDC's currency, and the difference would be the
allowable loss. 3 6 The problem with the Treasury's example-theoreti-
cally and in actual practice-is that the exchange is inextricably tied
to the subsequent contribution. The original debt holder actually
receives nothing for its exchange; its only benefit is the ability to ulti-
mately deduct its entire basis in the debt. 7 In effect, the bank has
been allowed a deduction for a loss on a bad debt, characterizing a
portion of the transaction as an allowable deduction for a loss
incurred on an exchange of property under Section 165, and charac-
terizing the remainder as a deduction for a charitable contribution
under Section 170.
III. PROPERTY Loss VERSUS BAD DEBT
A deduction for a bad debt is only permitted if the debt becomes
worthless within the taxable year.3" The statutory provision for the
deduction for bad debt losses is made, not under Section 165, but
under Section 166. The courts have found that these two Sections are
mutually exclusive.39 In Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner,'
the taxpayer claimed a deduction for a loss under Section 234(a)(4) of
33. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205, 206 (LAW AND ANALYSIS, Situation 3); see
supra note 13 and accompanying text.
34. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205, 206 (HOLDINGS, Situation 3); see supra note 17
and accompanying text.
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(c)(3) (as amended in 1977).
36. Id.
37. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
38. Note, Coping with the Specific Charge-off Method: Developing Standards to Determine
When an Outstanding Obligation is Worthless, 7 VA. TAX REV. 365, 375 (1987). "The
ultimate issue in determining whether a bad debt deduction will be allowed is if, in fact, the
outstanding obligation is worthless." Id. at 375.
39. See Putnam v. Commissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1956); Spring City Foundry Co., v.
[Vol. 43:721
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the Act of 1918 (the predecessor of the current Section 165), arising
from a debt that was not then ascertained to be worthless.4' The
Supreme Court of the United States disallowed the deduction stating:
The making of the specific provision as to debts indicates that
these were to be considered as a special class and that losses on
debts were not to be regarded as falling under the preceding gen-
eral provision. What was excluded from deduction under [the
predecessor of Section 166] cannot be regarded as allowed under
[the predecessor of Section 165J.42
Normally the IRS is quick to recognize the distinction and advise
taxpayers to correctly categorize their losses. Revenue Ruling 87-124,
however, indulges a less stringent standard, as it must, to validate the
IRS's interpretation.43 If the IRS were to deem the loss as one arising
from a debt, it would have to concede that the indebtedness had
become worthless during the taxable year. 4
A. Worthlessness
The Code, which painstakingly defines key words, has failed to
define "worthlessness, '45 leaving its definition to the courts.46 The
Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934); Lewellyn v. Electric Reduction Co., 275 U.S. 243 (1929);
accord Porter v. United States, 27 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1928).
40. 292 U.S. 182 (1934).
41. Id. at 185-86. The debtor had become bankrupt, leaving the debt in suspense. What
amount might be recovered was uncertain. There was, however, an expectation of some
recovery. Id. The Court was of the opinion that Congress "did not authorize the deduction of
a debt which was not then ascertained to be worthless but was recoverable in part, the amount
that was not recoverable being still uncertain." Id. at 189.
42. Id.
43. Moreover, the IRS has been reluctant to classify foreign debt as property in order to
allow a Section 165 deduction. In the Treasury's own opinion, "[tihe fact that the debtor [is] a
foreign country does not preclude classification of the obligation as a debt for the purposes of
section 166 of the Code." Rev. Rul. 72-1, 1972-1 C.B. 52, 55; see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-33-008
(Apr. 27, 1984). A corporate taxpayer's receivables from a foreign government were
characterized as debts, precluding any consideration of their deductibility under Section 165.
Id.; see also Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,265 (Aug. 1, 1984). Amounts owing but not paid by the
Iranian government on contracts between the taxpayer and that government, if and when
deductible, would be deductible as bad debts under Section 166 and not as losses under Section
165. Id.
44. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
45. See Note, supra note 38, at 381. The IRS offers only subjective guidance in
determining whether a debt is worthless, instructing its district director to "consider all
pertinent evidence, including the value of the collateral, if any, securing the debt and the
financial condition of the debtor." Treas. Reg. § 1.166-2(a) (as amended in 1973).
The Tax Court considers a debt wholly worthless when there are reasonable
grounds for abandoning any hope of repayment in the future. But this definition
only lays a foundation for determining worthlessness and provides no guidance
as to when hope of repayment should be abandoned and what the extent of the
taxpayer's efforts to collect the outstanding obligation should be.
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Supreme Court has posited an objective standard, holding that "[a]
loss, to be deductible, must have been sustained in fact during the
taxable year."47 Proving that the loss "in fact" occurred is the burden
of the taxpayer 48 and depends upon all the facts and circumstances of
the case. 49 This burden on a bank, in the case of an LDC debt, could
be a heavy one indeed.
By March 31, 1988, United States banks reported total claims on
foreign public borrowers50 in Latin America and the Caribbean to be
in excess of 108 billion dollars.51 Despite the perceived hopelessness of
the problem, one noted economist pointed out that "[t]he frequently
predicted crisis, in which debtor countries repudiate their debts and
big banks are no longer able to attract deposits, has not occurred. '"52
Financial disaster had been averted by extensive renegotiation of
Third World debt, involving rescheduling of payments and additional
financing. 53 As a result, in 1987, when Revenue Ruling 87-124 was
announced, no major debtor country had defaulted.54
The success of the debt management strategy militates against a
finding that the LDC debts are worthless. Moreover, the very tech-
niques employed in managing the debt-continued negotiation and
further extensions of credit-and the fact that the debtor has not
defaulted, are held by the courts to contradict claims by the taxpayer
that the debts are uncollectable. 55
Note, supra note 38, at 381.
46. The Code speaks only of "evidence of worthlessness." I.R.C. § 166 (1986).
47. Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287, 292 (1945) (emphasis in original).
48. See Sollitt Const. Co. v. United States, I Cl. Ct. 333 (1983); accord Riss v. Comm'r,
478 F.2d. 1160 (8th Cir. 1973).
49. See, e.g., Sollitt Const. Co., 1 Cl. Ct. at 345.
50. The term "foreign public borrower" encompasses foreign central governments and
their departments and possessions, foreign central banks, corporations and other agencies of
central governments, and any international or regional organization or subordinate or affiliated
agency, created by treaty or convention between sovereign states. OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY BULLETIN, CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 66
(Sept. 1988).
51. Id. at 76 (Table CM- 11-3. entitled - Total Claims on Foreigners by Type and Country
Reported by Banks in the United States, as of Mar. 31, 1988).
52. Feldstein, Latin America's Debt: Muddling Through Can be Just Fine, THE
ECONOMIST, June 27, 1987, at 21.
53. See, e.g., Orr, supra note 1.
54. See id. at 79.
55. See Riss v. Commissioner, 478 F.2d. 1160 (8th Cir. 1973) (The granting of additional
credit after failing to receive proper payment from a prior debt indicated that the debt was not
worthless.); Dustin v. Commissioner, 467 F.2d. 47 (9th Cir. 1972) (The fact that the debtor
had never defaulted on any of its obligations supported the Tax Court's determination that the




It seems ironic for the IRS to split the debt-for-nature swap, thus
circumventing the issue of worthlessness, so that it inures to the bene-
fit of the taxpayer. In litigation both priorand subsequent to Revenue
Ruling 87-124, the IRS has advocated an examination of the total
effect of multi-part transactions, especially when the motivation
behind the transaction is the resultant tax savings.56
In Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner,"' a savings and
loan institution and four other thrift institutions engaged in a series of
purchases and sales of loan participations in order to recognize a loss
deduction under Section 165.58 The IRS argued that the "reciprocal
sales" were merely exchanges, resulting in no recognizable loss or
gain.5 9 The only practical interpretation of the transaction under Sec-
tion 165, the IRS claimed, was that the simultaneous purchases and
sales were interdependent, and that the separate agreements should be
regarded as one transaction, rather than as separate sales between the
parties.' The IRS further contended that "[a] transaction involving
legally enforceable arrangements ... may lack substance and fail to
achieve the desired tax effect because it is purposeless apart from tax
motivations." 6'
According to the debt-for-nature swap outlined by Revenue Rul-
ing 87-124, the exchange of the debt for local currency is accompa-
nied by the simultaneous donation of the local currency to a
charitable organization. Query what else but tax considerations
would motivate a bank in this situation, and why the IRS has chosen
to separate rather than consolidate this transaction.
C. The Charitable Contribution Valuation
The IRS's bifurcation of the debt-for-charity swap also impli-
cates the charitable contribution portion of the transaction. Even
accepting, for the sake of argument, the IRS's characterization of the
debt as "property," the deduction allowed by the Revenue Ruling
must fail under traditional tax treatments of donated property. The
fair market value of the property, at the time of the contribution, is
the amount allowed as a deduction when property is contributed to a
56. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1974); Cottage Savings Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 372 (1988).
57. 90 T.C. 372 (1988).
58. Id. at 377-85.
59. Id. at 386.
60. Id. at 386-87.
61. Id. at 401 (citing Gregory v. Helverling, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)). The court disagreed,
concluding that the S & L had realized recognizable losses. Id.
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charitable organization, without any recognition of gain or loss in the
value of the property.62 In the case of appreciated property, in which
the allowable deduction may exceed the taxpayer's cost basis in the
property, this method of donation is highly desirable.63 When prop-
erty has declined in value, however, the established method for dispo-
sal is to sell the property, recognize the loss for tax purposes, and then
donate the proceeds, thereby obtaining a charitable contribution
deduction for the gift of cash.64
Nothing prevents banks holding LDC debt from undertaking
this well-established method that allows them to achieve, without the
perplexity, the same tax benefit provided by Revenue Ruling 87-124.65
It must be noted, however, that after disposal of the property for cash,
nothing guarantees that the bank will follow through and make the
charitable contribution, except the possibility that by making the con-
tribution, the bank receives an even greater benefit. 66  To be sure,
banks will not be clamoring to make these contributions of Third
World debt.67 When they do, however, their motivation could pre-
clude deduction as a charitable contribution.
Although the receipt of benefits by the donor does not necessarily
preclude a charitable deduction, courts are likely to deny a deduction
when the donor receives benefits that are substantial. For example, in
Ottowa Silica Co. v. United States,68 a corporation was denied a chari-
table deduction for contributing a portion of real property for a high
school sight.69 Even though the school district had solicited the dona-
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-I(c) (as amended in 1984).
63. In such a case, the contribution is deductible in an amount measured by the fair
market value of the property, even though the taxpayer does not have to recognize gain on the
appreciation in value. See Taxation of Banks, supra note 17, 9.14[3] at 9-28.
64. Id. at 9-29.
65. The real benefit inures to the charitable organization because the value of the gift in the
foreign country may exceed substantially the debt's fair market value. See supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
66. See Copeland, Buying Debt, Saving Nature, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 31, 1987, at 46. Gary
Caesar, head of international asset sales at BankAmerica Corp., remarked that debt for nature
swaps "will work only where the banks have written the debt down to next to nothing and can
claim some real benefits from a tax or political perspective." Id.
67. The Director of the National Wildlife Federation noted that her organization had been
unable to obtain donations of LDC debt from banks. Dionne, Treasury Agrees, supra note 21,
at 309. A bank would rather engage in a typical debt/equity swap, gaining at least some
prospect of enhancing its chances for recovery of its investment. As a New York investment
banker remarked, "Clearly, a bank would prefer an interest in a profitable fish farm to a
nonperforming loan." Dionne, Revenue Ruling, supra note 21, at 167; see Copeland, supra
note 7, at 46 ("Bankers are increasingly willing to trade their bad loans for investments in
developing nations, but hotels and factories are more what they have in mind.").
68. 699 F.2d 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
69. Id. at 1131.
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tion from the corporation, 70 a deduction for a charitable contribution
was denied primarily because the corporation acted more out of its
own self interest.7' The court concluded that "the benefits to be
derived by [the corporation] from the transfer were substantial
enough to provide [the corporation] with a quid pro quo for the trans-
fer and thus effectively destroyed the charitable nature of the
transfer. 72
As in Ottowa, the banks are being solicited by the conservation
organizations for donations of LDC debt. The banks, however, are
only willing to make the donation if they are able to gain a "substan-
tial benefit" from the transaction.73 Ironically, it is the special tax
treatment itself that motivates the bank, destroying the charitable
nature of the transfer. This is especially so in the case of an LDC
debt, where its market price has been discounted so low that its sale
would yield less than the tax savings provided by Revenue Ruling 87-
124.
D. Withers v. Commissioner: The Flip-Flop of
Revenue Ruling 87-124
Another instance exists in which the IRS's position in Revenue
Ruling 87-124 is irreconcilable with its previous posture under very
similar circumstances. In Withers v. Commissioner,7  the IRS
opposed the identical deduction it now specifically endorses in Reve-
nue Ruling 87-124. In Withers, taxpayers contributed corporate
stocks that had bases exceeding their fair market value to a qualified
charity.75 The taxpayers argued that they were entitled to deductions
equal to their cost basis in the property contributed, 76 effectively argu-
ing for a two-stage deduction. The taxpayers claimed that if under
Section 107 they were entitled to a charitable contribution deduction
equal only to the fair market value of the property when contributed,
then they were also entitled under Section 165 to a loss deduction
equal to the difference between the property basis and fair market
value.77 The IRS, on the other hand, contended that the deduction
was limited to the fair market value of the property transferred, and
70. Id. at 1132.
71. Id. at 1135 (The corporation expected that the construction of access roads to service
the high school would greatly enhance development of the remainder of the corporation's
land.).
72. Id. at 1132.
73. See Copeland, supra note 66, at 46.
74. 69 T.C. 900 (1978).
75. Id. at 901.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 903.
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that no deductible loss was created by the contribution. 7 The court
relied on the IRS's own unchallenged regulations 79 and held that the
charitable contribution deduction was limited to the fair market value
of the property contributed.80 It further held that although the tax-
payers "realized" a loss on the difference between the value and the
basis of the shares contributed, the loss was not "sustained" under
Section 165(a), nor recognized under Section 165(c). Aside from the
mutual exclusivity conflict between Sections 165 and 166, Revenue
Ruling 87-124 completely ignores the rule of Withers, thus com-
pounding the confusion."
IV. QUALIFYING ORGANIZATION?
The most obvious issue is whether or not the organization in the
foreign country is qualified to receive a charitable contribution under
Section 170 as stipulated by Revenue Ruling 87-124. The Code
allows a deduction only for contributions to be used within the United
States. 82 The IRS, however, does not foreclose deductions for contri-
butions to foreign charities. Contributions to a domestic charity
described in Section 170(c)(2) that are channeled to a foreign charita-
ble organization for furtherance of the domestic charity's purposes
may be deductible.8 3 Likewise, when a domestic charity is formed for
foreign wildlife purposes and makes grants to foreign charities, contri-
butions to the domestic charity are deductible.8 4 Contributions ulti-
mately committed to go to a foreign organization, however, are not
deductible simply because they come to rest momentarily in a qualify-
ing domestic organization."
A. The Control Test
The overriding consideration in both situations is control and
discretion over the use of the funds by the domestic organization to
insure that they will be used to carry out its functions and purposes.
When this criterion is applied, the conflict with Revenue Ruling 87-
124 is apparent. As described in the Ruling, the terms of the program
provide that the funds can be used only in the foreign country. This
78. Id. at 901.
79. Id. at 905 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (as amended in 1972)).
80. Id. at 902-03 ("The general rule ... allows taxpayers a deduction equal to the fair
market value of the property contributed .... We will not change that result here.").
81. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
82. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (1986). For the text of Section 170(c)(2), see supra note 27.
83. Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48.
84. Rev. Rul. 75-65, 1975-1 C.B. 79.
85. Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2 C.B. 101, 104.
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restriction alone could be held to strip control effectively from the
domestic charity. 6  Moreover, one actual debt-for-nature swap-
viewed as typical of the Revenue Ruling 87-124 formulation-
describes the foreign government as the administrator of the conser-
vation areas, and the domestic organization as a mere advisor. s7
Simply handing over the funds to the foreign country for admin-
istration does not further the purposes of the United States based
charitable organization. Many of these Latin American countries
lack the bureaucratic personnel to effectively administer United States
programs, in particular those dealing with the use of aid monies for
development projects."s Most of the difficulty with the administra-
tion of United States programs in Latin America lies in ensuring that
the aid is properly delivered and that it performs the stated task.
Some Latin American countries have reputations for administrative
corruption and misuse of aid funds. Although such corruption exists
in almost every nation, the funneling off of development aid by gov-
ernment officials in lesser developed countries could vitiate the effec-
tiveness of these conservation programs.8 9
Even so, any attempt by a charitable organization to force com-
pliance with the control requirement would most likely be an affront
to foreign sovereignty. Debt-for-nature swaps do not involve typical
charitable activities, such as hospitals or missionaries, but rather
involve efforts by United States organizations to exert actual control
over a foreign country's land. Even if an organization has obtained an
agreement with the state extending over a considerable time, the state
still may exercise its power of eminent domain over its own resources
by nationalizing the enterprise.90 This power is well-recognized in
86. In Revenue Ruling 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48, the IRS found it significant, in approving a
donation to a foreign organization, that the directors of the domestic organization
administering the funds had the right to withdraw approval of the grant and use the funds for
other charitable purposes.
87. See Beautiful Barter in Bolivia, THE ECONOMIST, July 16, 1987, at 26 ("The Bolivian
government remains in control of its land, with the American organisation acting as an advisor
only."); Shabecoff, supra note 5, at C2, col. 3. But see Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States,
438 F.2d 684, 687 (Ist Cir. 1971) (upholding the deductibility of a donation to a foreign
hospital, and noting that at no time had the foreign government exercised any control over the
management and operation of the hospital).
88. M. KRYZANEK, U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 146 (1985).
89. Id. at 147.
90. I. DELupIs, FINANCE AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS IN DEVELOPING
CouNTRiEs 53 (1973). Nationalism in the LDC is a major consideration. Some argue that the
increased ownership and control of domestic entities by foreigners that typically follows debt/
equity swaps is intolerable to the LDC. See Alexander & Ross, supra note 9. Evidence is
emerging that this argument has considerable merit. Increased foreign pressure aimed at
influencing the environmental policies of the Amazon Forest countries has brought strong
negative reactions. Speaking on Amazon issues recently, a powerful Brazilian Army Minister
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international law. According to the United Nations General Assem-
bly, a state always retains its sovereignty over natural resources; natu-
ral resources cannot validly be transferred to the sovereignty of
another state.91
B. The Legislative Solution
International conservation groups are cognizant of the inherent
problems in the Revenue Ruling and, in 1987, advocated legislation to
accomplish their objectives. 92 In response, a bill was introduced to
the Senate Committee on Finance to amend the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986. It permitted taxpayers who donated debt of developing
countries to charitable organizations to obtain a charitable deduction
equal to the taxpayer's basis in the debt.93  The bill specifically
allowed a full basis deduction for contributions of LDC debt to quali-
said, "Any foreign influence is unwelcome." World Concern for Rain Forest Rankles Brazil,
Miami Herald, Mar. 13, 1989, at IA, col. 5. He added, however, that "[f]oreign funds are fine
as long as they are turned over to the government to use as it wishes." Id. A government
scientist, recognizing the emotional issues, stated, "This business of the dangers to our national
sovereignty is very sensitive and it will continue to be." Id. Nationalistic fervor is spreading to
other Amazon countries. At a meeting in Quito, Ecuador, representatives from Bolivia,
Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela joined Brazil in repudiating "any foreign
interference in the policies that the Amazon countries carry out in the region." Id. When a
group of United States government officials suggested that Brazil implement debt reduction
programs in conjunction with rain forest preservation, "[t]he answer they received was a
succinct 'no.' " Id.
91. See G.A. Res. 1803 (1962), reprinted in 9 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 107 (D.
Djonovich ed. 1974).
92. See Letter from Terrill Hyde (counsel to the World Wildlife Fund) to Sen. Baucus
(Dec. 10, 1987) (available from office of Sen. Chafee) (urging passage of S. 1781 to foster debt-
for-nature swaps).
93. See S. 1781, supra note 4, at S14,064. The amendment provides in part:
SECTION 1. CHARITABLE DEDUCTION FOR CONTRIBUTION
OF DEBT OF DEVELOPING NATIONS TO
CONSERVATION GROUPS.
"(m) CONTRIBUTIONS OF QUALIFIED DEBT INSTRUMENTS FOR
INTERNATIONAL CONSERVATION PURPOSES.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.- In the case of a qualified debt contribution, the
amount of the deduction otherwise allowable under this section shall not be less
than the donor's basis in the debt instrument being contributed.
"(2) QUALIFIED DEBT CONTRIBUTION.- For purposes of this
subsection, the term 'qualified debt contribution' means a contribution-
"(A) of a debt instrument ... evidencing a loan to foreign state
... eligible for World Bank or International Development Association financing,
"(B) to a qualified organization ... and
"(C) with respect to which the taxpayer receives from the donee
a written statement that such debt instrument (or the proceeds therefrom)
will be used for an international conservation purpose.
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fying organizations for international conservation purposes.9 4 The
liberal interpretation of Revenue Ruling 87-124, offered by the Treas-
ury, however, has quieted the concerns of conservation groups, who
now no longer feel the need for legislation.9"
V. CONCLUSION
The goal of Revenue Ruling 87-124-to assist in saving the
world's forests and the animals that inhabit them-is an admirable
one. The legal contortions required to justify the interpretation given
by the Treasury, however, may severely strain future IRS positions in
which taxpayers argue for similar tax treatment of losses, bad debts,
and charitable contributions, outside the context of debt-for-nature
swaps. 96 Since deductions are a matter of legislative grace, 97 a con-
cise, narrowly drafted amendment could achieve the desired result
and relieve the Treasury from inevitably having to rule on each trans-
action. The satisfaction achieved for the international conservation
groups could be short-lived should the Treasury be forced to abandon
its ruling in the face of widespread abuse of the inherent contradic-
tions between precedential tax law and Revenue Ruling 87-124.
RONNY JAY HALPERIN
94. The bill defines "international conservation purpose" as:
[T]he expenditure of funds in or with respect to the foreign country that is the
obligor (or the guarantor) of the qualified debt instrument for one or more of the
following purposes-
"(A) a purpose described in clause (i) [preservation of land areas for
recreation and education] or (ii) [protection of natural habitats of fish, wildlife, or
plants] of subsection (h)(4)(A);
"(B) the support of musuem, park, conservation, and nature and
conservation education personnel and programs;
"(C) the facilitation of cohabitation between inhabitants of a
particular area and fish, wildlife, plant, or similar ecosystems in the area;
"(D) research and experimentation in connection with any of the
purposes described in subparagraphs (A) through (C); and
"(E) the support of international, national, and local governmental
programs to accomplish any of the purposes described in subparagraphs (A)
through (D).
S. 1780, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
95. See Letter from William Reilly (President of World Wildlife Fund) to Rep. Pease
(Apr. 28, 1988) (available from office of Sen. Chafee) (expressing satisfaction with Treasury's
interpretation of Revenue Ruling 87-124).
96. A Peruvian economist has proposed that a fund be established, using a variation of
debt-for-nature swaps, to help fight the war on drugs. Plan Would Fight Drugs and Debt, The
Miami Herald, Dec. 19, 1988, (Business Monday), at 17, col. 1. The donated funds would be
used for economic development programs in areas where drugs are produced and for projects
that encourage farmers to grow alternative crops. Id.
97. Withers v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 900, 905 (1978).
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